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REMARKS
Keynote Address
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET.)*
Thank you for that very kind introduction and nice welcome. It’s
always a pleasure to address an audience in this forum. I’ve been
here before and I’ve always enjoyed it, and I hope I’ll enjoy it today.
As I understand it we are celebrating the University of Miami
law school’s program. The topic for discussion at this symposium is
“The Constitution on Campus: Do Students Shed their Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates?” Because the question closely parrots the excerpt from the Supreme Court’s opinion in the student speech case
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,1 I
infer that among the principle rights at issue are those protected by
the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Fortas’ opinion and the Court provided a categorical answer to the question. He wrote: “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”2 But then rather surprisingly, instead of citing cases interpreting the First Amendment, he continued:
This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court
for 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska and Bartels v.
Iowa, this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented States from forbidding
the teaching of a foreign language to young students.

*
1
2

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1975–2010.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 506.
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Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and
parent.3
Thus, the Tinker case, which at first seemed to point only at First
Amendment rights, actually suggests our topic should be more encompassing.
The answer to the question whether students have shed their constitutional rights necessarily depends on what rights the student
seeks to exercise in the setting in which he does so. Clearly no
student has the right during a mathematics class to argue at length
and without interruption of the importance of minimizing global
warming. But it is equally clear that she cannot be punished for expressing her views about that issue in response to a question in a
science class. And even assuming that five members of the Supreme
Court correctly held that the Second Amendment protects the
citizen’s right to possess a handgun in his home,4 it does not follow
that the right has been shed if a court concludes it does not extend
to carrying the weapon in such places as a college campus. In short,
it is necessary to determine the scope of a given right before deciding whether the right has been shed or impermissibly burdened in a
school setting.
Presumably students have the same fundamental rights as those
enjoyed by other members of the public. On at least two occasions,
however, a majority of the Court has drawn those principles into
question, at least as it pertains to high school students. In both cases,
I dissented from the majority’s discussion and decision limiting the
constitutional rights of public school students. In 1986, I dissented
from Chief Justice Berger’s opinion for the Court in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser.5 In that case, a Washington high school
student named Matthew Fraser had given a speech at a school assembly nominating a classmate for student elective office.6 Fraser’s
speech contained sexual innuendo and suggestive conduct.7 The

3
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6
7

Id.
See generally Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
See id. at 677.
See id. at 677–678.

2017]

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

361

school suspended him for violating a rule prohibiting the use of obscene language on campus.8 A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary action.9 Although I agreed that Fraser did not
necessarily have a constitutional right to deliver his speech at a
school assembly, I thought it clear that he had not received adequate
notice that he might be punished for doing so.10 The school agreed
that Fraser had violated the rule against “disruptive conduct,” but in
my view that prohibition was insufficient to notify Fraser that his
speech would illicit disciplinary consequences, particularly as there
was no evidence Fraser’s speech had caused any material disruption
to the school’s educational activities.11 In light of the interest in free
expression protected by the First Amendment and the interest in fair
procedure protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, I would have
held the constitution barred the school’s punitive response to Fraser’s speech.
In 2007, I dissented from Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the
Court in Morse v. Frederick.12 In that case, Alaska high school student Joseph Frederick was disciplined for displaying a fourteen-foot
banner bearing the puzzling phrase, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”13 You
have to pause for a minute and reflect on the meaning of that message. That case was quite remarkable because the majority first concluded that Frederick’s ambiguous message could reasonably be
construed as advocating the use of illegal drugs and then held that
his message could be censored for that very reason.14 Contrary to a
mountain of precedent, the majority determined that the First
Amendment did not merely permit censorship based on the content
of the student’s message, but more perversely, that it permitted censorship based on disagreement with the speaker’s viewpoint. The
majority’s opinion in Morse limited protection for student speech in
a manner that was wholly unsupported by the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Conversely, Morse adopted a blanket rule that
student speech may be censored anytime a public school official
8
9
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11
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14

See id. at 678.
See id. at 685.
See id. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 393.
See id. at 394–395.
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reasonably perceives that speech as advocating illegal drug use. As
an initial matter, I doubt that Frederick’s original phrase, “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS,” could be reasonably understood as advocating anything. In any event, the principal of Frederick’s high school interpreted the words on his banner as encouraging marijuana use, 15 a
message with which he disagreed. Under First Amendment doctrine,
viewpoint based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional, and advocacy of illegal conduct may be punished only when
the advocacy is likely to invite lawless action.16 Yet, the majority
ignored those basic First Amendment principles and upheld Frederick’s punishment based on school officials’ opposition to his
message, or one possible interpretation of his message.
Before Morse, “the beliefs of third parties reasonable or otherwise”17 never dictated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy. That’s a quote from my dissent. I see no reason why the
subjective views of state officials should control the extent of First
Amendment protection on campus when listeners’ perceptions do
not determine the scope of First Amendment rights in other contexts.
Even if Frederick had intended to promote marijuana use, there was
no indication that his speech would have any persuasive influence
on his classmates. As I noted in my dissent,
Most students. . . do not shed their brains at the
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when they see it. The notion that the message
on this banner would persuade even the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her
behavior is most implausible.18
The majority opinion in Morse is particularly troublesome given
that the Tinker decision had already established that basic First
Amendment protections apply in public schools. In Tinker, several
public school students in Des Moines, Iowa planned to wear black
armbands to express their opposition to the Vietnam War.19 The Des
15

See id. at 398.
See id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17
Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18
Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504
(1969).
16
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Moines public school district adopted a policy calling for the suspension of any student who refused to remove the armband.20 The
students challenged the policy on First Amendment grounds and the
Court determined the policy violated the constitution.21 The school
district had argued that its censorship was justified because it feared
the students’ expression of a controversial and unpopular opinion
would generate disturbances.22 But the Court held that the school
district’s purported fear of disturbance, without more, cannot justify
the suppression of student speech.23
Rather, the Court explained in order for public school officials
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, they must
be able to show that their action “was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”24 Where there is no
showing that the forbidden conduct would materially infringe on
rights of others or disrupt schools’ educational programs, the censorship cannot be sustained. Tinker thus stands for the proposition
that nondestructive student speech cannot be banned merely because
it expressed a viewpoint that is unpopular or contradictory to the
school’s message. I would have applied this rule in the Morse case
to hold that Frederick could not be punished for displaying his banner.
The Tinker rule is not only consistent with the First Amendment
doctrine, but also has the important benefit of protecting students’
intellectual openness and exchange. When the Tinker students wore
their black armbands in 1965, mainstream public opinion regarded
opposition to the Vietnam War as “unpatriotic, if not treason.”25 As
I noted in my Morse dissent, Des Moines school district was not
unreasonable for fearing that the arm bands might start an argument
or cause a disturbance.26 Nevertheless, the Tinker Court insisted that
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See id.
See id. at 514.
See id. at 508.
See id. at 514.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 447 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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under the constitution, we must take that risk.27 It is this sort of hazardous freedom, this kind of openness that is the basis of our national
strength, and the independence and vigor of Americans who grow
up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious society.
It seems to me that protecting this openness is no less important
on campus than elsewhere in society. For even in high school, a rule
that permits only one point of view to be expressed is less likely to
produce correct answers than the open discussion of countervailing
views. Ironically on the same day that the chief justice announced
the decision upholding viewpoint based discrimination in Morse, he
also announced the judgment of the Court in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life.28 That case was a 5-4 decision
that later paved the way for the Court’s most unfortunate decision in
Citizens United.29 In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court declared that
when it comes to defining what speech qualifies as unprotected advocacy, “we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.”30 Students of the First Amendment might wonder why that
rule applies to corporate entities that wish to contribute unlimited
funds to influence elections for a public office, but not to students
who wish to express an unpopular point of view inside the schoolhouse gate.
Thank you very much.

27

See id.
Federal Election Com’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449
(2007).
29
See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
30
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 482.
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